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ROLLING OVER BORROWERS: PREVENTING EXCESSIVE
REFINANCING AND OTHER NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE
PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, W. Allan Jones began making small, short-term loans in
exchange for a postdated check written for the combined value of the
loan and a service fee.' This practice had not been seen for over half
a century, when "salary lenders" provided short-term loans for small
sums in exchange for a future paycheck.2 In 1999, just six years
after Mr. Jones resurrected the deferred payment industry,
commonly known as the payday loan industry, payday lenders
issued about $8 billion worth of payday loans.3 In 2004, the industry
made $50 billion in loans,4 a staggering 525% increase in just five
years. That same year, it was estimated that the industry charged
$3.4 billion a year in fees, such as interest and finance charges, to
payday loan borrowers.5
The attractive growth potential offered by the payday loan
industry has caused an explosion in the number of payday loan
stores around the nation; their number doubled between the years
2000 and 2003 and stood, in 2005, at 22,000.6 To put this growth in
1. Many authorities credit Mr. Jones with having started the modern payday loan
industry in 1993, but this has not been conclusively verified. See Charles A. Bruch, Comment,
Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable
Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 1257, 1270 (2001).
2. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-tiered ConsumerFi nancial Marketplace:
The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury
Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 618 (2000). Due to the enactment of the Uniform
Small Loan Act in 1916, such practices had all but vanished by World War II. See id. at 620-
21.
3. Teresa Dixon Murray, Fast Money at a Steep Price: Firms Thrive Providing Quick
Cash, Goods at Exorbitant Rates, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 13, 2005, at Al.
4. Id.
5. Steve Hartsoe, N.C. Officials Strengthen Payday Lending Inquiry: Advance America
Told To Turn Over Papers; Subpoena Issued, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 27, 2004, at 3D.
6. leva M. Augstums, Fast Cash Is Gaining Currency: Local Firms Expand as Payday
Lending Goes Mainstream, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 4, 2005, at 1D.
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perspective, there are more payday loan stores in the state of
California than there are McDonald's and Burger King restaurants
combined.' Despite this rapid expansion, and the subsequent
increase in competition among payday loan lenders, the fees
charged to borrowers for receiving payday loans have not decreased,
as would be expected; since 1993, most fees have remained at the
maximum allowed by law.8
The dramatic growth of the payday loan industry and the failure
of the market to self-regulate payday loan fees have caused concern
for many consumer protection advocates, who call for the reform of
a system that they claim takes advantage of poor and uneducated
borrowers, often forcing these borrowers to refinance when unable
to repay their loans.9 Payday loan critics also complain that many
lenders have aggressive, unfair collection practices.1 ° Although
payday loan critics have proposed several types of reform, most, if
not all, have recommended the imposition of usury laws-laws
restricting the amount of interest a lender can charge-to prevent
payday lenders from taking advantage of borrowers. 1 The imposi-
tion of usury law on the payday loan industry presents two con-
cerns. First, loopholes in federal legislation have historically
prevented successful enforcement of usury laws against payday
lenders. 2 Second, assuming these loopholes could be closed, the
enforcement of strict usury laws against payday lenders could, by
making payday lending unprofitable, eliminate the industry."' If the
goal of a state with payday lending problems is to eliminate the
industry, then usury laws would be an effective tool for doing so.'4
If, however, the aim of the state is not to end payday lending, but
rather to ensure that borrowers are treated fairly by lenders, then
the use of usury laws is not the ideal approach. Instead, payday loan
reform should create a situation that is acceptable for both lenders
7. Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model That
Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 9 (2003).
8. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 117 (2002).
9. See id. at 69-70.
10. See id. at 77.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.B.
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and borrowers. The best way to protect borrowers, while still
allowing payday lenders the freedom to issue consensual loans, is to
change the way payday lending operates. Four adjustments in
payday lending are necessary to enable this balance: (1) ensuring
that borrowers are informed; (2) limiting loan refinancing; (3)
guaranteeing that fair collection practices are followed; and (4)
improving enforcement of the law.
This Note will analyze the problems associated with payday
lending in four parts. First, a discussion of the demographics of
payday loan borrowers will show that payday loans are often
targeted at borrowers who tend to be less educated and economically
disadvantaged. Second, a detailed description of how the payday
loan industry works will point to refinancing as the most serious
problem afflicting payday loan borrowers. Third, analysis of usury
laws in connection with payday lending will reveal the flaws
inherent in a solution that seeks only to restrict interest rates.
Finally, this Note will propose a solution that effectively regulates
the industry, without the disadvantages of strict usury laws.
I. PAYDAY LOAN BORROWER DEMOGRAPHICS
One of the reasons most frequently offered to justify regulation of
the payday loan industry is that it preys on minorities, women, and
those who are poor or uneducated. 5 Statistics supplied by the
payday loan industry refute this claim; however, those supplied by
various state agencies appear to support it. i s
Most of the industry's statistics are derived from a survey con-
ducted by the Credit Research Center at Georgetown University.
7
According to the survey, about half of payday loan borrowers have
an average annual income between $25,000 and $50,000.'8 The
survey also indicated that almost ninety-four percent of borrowers
15. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 100-01.
16. See infra notes 17-20, 37-46 and accompanying text.
17. GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., PAYDAY
ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND (2001), available at
http://www.cfsa.net/downloads/analysis-customer-demand.pdf.
18. See id. at 28.
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have a high school diploma, and that more than half have completed
at least some college.19
On their face, these findings lend support to payday loan industry
claims that payday lending does not take advantage of poor and
uneducated borrowers; however, the survey has serious flaws that
cast doubt on its results. First, the findings are based on a very
small sample size. The study began with a pool of 5364 payday loan
borrowers, randomly selected from payday loan offices nationwide.2 °
Survey takers then attempted to conduct interviews with the
selected borrowers by placing telephone calls to their residences."
An amazing 1274 borrowers, or about twenty-four percent of the
initial pool, could not be reached because their phone numbers were
invalid.22 Another 1894 borrowers, an additional thirty-five percent
of the initial pool, were not available during the interview period.23
Survey takers made contact with only about half the initial pool, or
2196 borrowers.24 Of those borrowers actually contacted, 1584, or
seventy-two percent, either denied having received a payday loan or
refused to be interviewed.2" The final sample from which the study
drew its conclusions consisted of only 427 borrowers, or eight
percent of the total sample.26 That the initial sample of 5364
borrowers itself was only a small sample of the total number of
borrowers who use the country's more than 10,000 payday loan
offices2" emphasizes how small the final sample of 427 borrowers
really was.
The small sample size raises serious concerns about the accuracy
of the study's conclusion because it is likely that the sample was not
an accurate representation of the average payday loan borrower.28
Furthermore, the authors of the study acknowledged that most
19. See id. at 33 (noting that about thirty-six percent of borrowers had completed some
college and an additional nineteen percent had college degrees).
20. Id. at 20-21.
21. Id.
22. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 17, at 20-21.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 21.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2.
28. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military:
The Law and Geography of 'TPayday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 663 n.48
(2005).
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respondents who quit the interview did so after the first few
questions asked about the type of credit the respondents had
previously used.29 Those who refused to admit they had used a
payday loan "were unwilling to answer financial questions and
answered 'no' to avoid further questions of this nature.""0 This
finding is important because those with the greatest financial
difficulties would probably be the most reluctant to participate in an
interview because of embarrassment or fear. Also, some of the most
impoverished borrowers might not have had access to a telephone,
or might have been working longer or more irregular hours, making
it less likely that they could have been reached for an interview. All
these factors provide reason to believe that those borrowers who did
participate in the interview were better off financially than the
average borrower.31
The second flaw with the study is that the authors interviewed
borrowers who had taken out a loan during the six months leading
up to and through the holiday season. From October to January,
even individuals making $50,000 a year might be in need of extra
holiday cash and need to take advantage of a payday loan to make
up the difference. Some borrowers may have taken out loans in
advance of an expected Christmas bonus, knowing the bonus would
arrive in time for the payday loan to be paid in full when due. The
survey easily could have avoided this potential problem by drawing
from an initial pool of borrowers who had taken out a loan between
January and December.
The final potential problem with the survey is that it was
financed in part by the Community Financial Services Association
of America, one of the trade associations of the payday loan
industry.33 In fact, Association members provided the names of
borrowers for the study.34 The Association's involvement casts
suspicion on whether the study was conducted in a manner that
would lead to results favorable to the industry, whether intention-
29. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 17, at 21.
30. Id.
31. Graves & Peterson, supra note 28, at 663 n.48.
32. Eligible participants were those who had taken out a loan within the six months prior
to the December and January interviews. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 17, at 20.
33. Id. at iii.
34. Id. at 19-20.
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ally or unintentionally.35 This suspicion is only bolstered by the fact
that the Government Accountability Office (formerly the General
Accounting Office) has criticized the Credit Research Center in the
past for making assumptions in favor of the lending industry.36
Studies and surveys organized by state-funded organizations have
painted a much bleaker picture of the payday loan industry. One
Colorado study, for example, found that "[t]he 'average' Colorado
payday loan borrower is a thirty-six-year-old single woman, making
$2370 per month, employed as a laborer or office worker and in her
current job for about three and one-half years."3 A 1999 survey by
the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions found that the
average payday loan borrower's salary was just over $25,000,38
while the average income for the citizens of the state as a whole was
over $31,000.39 In Wisconsin, the average borrower's gross income
in 2001 was only $24,673,40 whereas the average gross income of
Wisconsin citizens that year was almost $32,000. 41
Statistics like these have led opponents of the payday loan
industry to conclude that payday loan lenders specifically target
minorities and low-income individuals.42 A study conducted for the
American Association of Retired Persons found that low-income and
minority households were more likely to have a payday loan store
within a mile of their homes than higher-income and non-minority
35. This is not to say that the study has no probative value in the payday loan debate and
should be completely disregarded. The data, especially the opinions about the payday loan
industry offered by payday loan users, can shed some light on the different sides of the debate.
That data, however, must be considered carefully, especially in light of the state-funded data
that produced different results. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
36. See Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in
Shaping the Law, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1, 11, 18.
37. Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter To Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of Colorado's
Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387, 405 (2005).
38. ILL. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., SHORT TERM LENDING: FINAL REPORT 26 (1999), available at
http://www.idfpr.com/dfi/ccd/pdfs/Shorterm.pdf [hereinafter ILLINOIS REPORT].
39. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 460
(2000), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-1995_2000.html
(showing per capita income in Illinois in 1999 to be $31,278 in current (1999) dollars).
40. Johnson, supra note 8, at 99.
41. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 422
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-2001-2005.html.
42. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 100.
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households. 4' A North Carolina survey found that, even among
low-income households, African Americans were twice as likely
as Caucasians to have taken out a payday loan. 44 Non-industry-
sponsored reports also support the conclusion that the average
payday loan borrower's salary falls below national averages, 45 and
that payday loan borrowers are often minorities.46
There is nothing inherently immoral or illegal about specifically
targeting a service at minorities and low-income individuals, unless
the service takes advantage of these groups; an understanding of
how the payday loan industry operates demonstrates that at least
some lenders are taking advantage of these, and other, payday loan
borrowers.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY
A. The Payday Loan Process
Most payday lenders use roughly the same process for issuing
loans. 47 First, the borrower and the lender agree about the size of
the loan and the amount of its accompanying finance charge.4"
43. See SHARON HERMANSON & GEORGE GABERLAVAGE, AM. ASS'N OF RETIRED PERSONS,
THE ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 4 & fig. 4 (2001), available at http://assets.
aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/ib 5lfinance.pdf.
44. Stegman & Faris, supra note 7, at 15.
45. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 99 ("In the six states where over half of the nation's
payday lenders are located, the median incomes are below the national median, and in four
of them, the poverty rates are above average."). Compare Chessin, supra note 37, at 406
(noting that the average monthly income for Colorado payday loan borrowers is $2373, which
equals only $28,476 a year, and noting an "inverse relationship" between income and use of
payday loans), and Stegman & Faris, supra note 7, at 15 (reporting that in Indiana, Illinois,
and Wisconsin, the average income of payday loan borrowers are, respectively, $25,000 to
$30,000, $24,000, and $19,000), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2006, at 452 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
2006/2006edition.html (showing that from 2000 to 2004, the approximate time period in which
the above studies were conducted, the average per capita income in the United States
increased from $29,845 to $32,937 measured in 2000 dollars), and id. at 468 (showing average
household income in 2003 to be $43,564). Because some of the above studies discussed
household income and others appeared to focus on individuals, both are included.
46. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 100; Stegman & Faris, supra note 7, at 15.
47. See WILLIAM 0. BROWN, JR. ETAL., CONSUMER CREDIT RESEARCH FOUND., THE PAYDAY
PRIMER 2 (2004), available at http://www.consumercreditresearchfoundation.orglfiles/
PaydayLendingFinal-woTitle.pdf.
48. Id.
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About half of all payday loans are for amounts between two and
three hundred dollars, and the typical finance charge runs between
fifteen and twenty dollars for every hundred dollars borrowed.49
Second, after the lender and borrower have agreed on the loan and
its accompanying fees, the borrower usually must show a recent
bank statement, a pay stub, and identification." Third, the lender
verifies the information and decides whether the borrower is
creditworthy.51 Fourth, the borrower writes a postdated check (or
authorizes a future electronic debit from her checking account) for
the combined value of the loan and the finance charge, then receives
her loan.52 Finally, unless the loan is repaid or refinanced within a
specific period of time, usually within two weeks, the lender deposits
the check, or electronically withdraws payment from the borrower's
account.53
The payday loan industry advertises payday loans as superior
to writing bad checks or paying late fees. Instead of paying the
national average of twenty-five dollars in bank and merchant
return-check fees on a one hundred dollar check, the industry
argues, a borrower can take out a payday loan for a fee of only
fifteen dollars.54 The industry makes similar claims regarding the
advantage of payday loans over late payments on car loans, credit
card balances, utility bills, and rent.5"
Although there might be some truth to the industry's claim, the
argument has three flaws that limit the value of payday loans as a
viable alternative to bad checks and late fees. First, few people write
bad checks when they know they have insufficient funds, so few
turn to payday loans as a substitute for a returned-check fee.56
Second, when the car loan, utility bill, credit card payment, or rent
comes due again the following month, the borrower will probably
again be unable to pay because repayment of the payday loan will
49. Id.
50. Johnson, supra note 8, at 9.
51. BROWN ET AL., supra note 47, at 2.
52. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 601. In some cases, especially through internet-
based lenders, a delayed automatic debit agreement is used in place of a check. Id.
53. Id.
54. See CMTY. FIN. SERVS. ASS'N OF AM., PAYDAY ADVANCE: A COST EFFECTIVE
ALTERNATIVE 10 (2002) [hereinafter PAYDAY ADVANCE].
55. See generally id.
56. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 606.
2408 [Vol. 48:2401
ROLLING OVER BORROWERS
be due.57 At best, therefore, a payday loan can defer these fees and
late charges only until they are due the next month.5"
Finally, the industry's argument that payday loans are a con-
venient alternative to returned-check fees and late charges is
defective because borrowers, who often find their funds insufficient
the next month to cover both their normal expenses and repayment
of the payday loan, are forced to refinance, or "roll over," the loan for
an additional fee.59 This cycle may continue until the borrower has
refinanced so many times that the total cost of the payday loan far
exceeds any late fees or returned check charges that the borrower
would have faced had she not taken the loan.60 This refinancing trap
is the most serious consumer interest concern in payday lending.
B. The Refinancing Trap
The availability of and need for refinancing makes payday loans
different from other, similar loans, such as those given by rent-to-
own stores and pawn shops. With rent-to-own and pawn companies,
if borrowers default on the loan, they simply lose their security
interest and walk away with no further obligations or charges.6
Defaulting payday loan borrowers, however, remain obligated to pay
not only the loan principal and fees, but also any applicable interest
and returned-check charges.62
Refinancing is a common problem in payday lending. A joint
survey conducted by the Consumer Federation of America and the
U.S. Public Interest Research Group found that about eighty-three
percent of payday loan stores allow borrowers to renew unpaid
loans.63 A North Carolina study concluded that half of all the payday
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 601, 606.
60. See infra Part II.B.
61. Bruch, supra note 1, at 1273.
62. See, e.g., Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, TN, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1046 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (describing a check cashing agreement that included such
obligations).
63. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, RENT-A-BANK
PAYDAY LENDING: How BANKS HELP PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS
5 (2001), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayreport.pdf [hereinafter RENT-A-
BANK LENDING].
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loan borrowers surveyed paid more in refinancing fees than the
value of their initial loans.' This refinancing trap has become a
problem serious enough to merit the attention of the U.S. Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, who stated that "[o]ne of the principal features
of payday loans that have led to abuses is frequent renewal,
resulting in additional fees to the consumer."65
Despite the accusations levied by consumer advocates, the payday
loan industry continues to deny that refinancing is a problem.66
According to the industry's Best Practices guidelines, a list of ideals
proposed for payday lenders, a lender should allow a borrower to
refinance a loan no more than four times, or the maximum number
of times allowed by applicable law, whichever is fewer.6"
Even if these Best Practices guidelines were binding, lenders
could easily evade or ignore them by having borrowers repay the
initial loan, sometimes with cash obtained from a different payday
loan company, write a new check, and start the cycle anew.' Critics
of the payday loan industry refer to this practice as "touch and go"
financing.69 Some payday lenders do not even consider such
transactions to be refinancing. One Colorado payday loan company
argued, for example, that a law disallowing the renewal of a payday
loan more than once did not apply to a series of loans made to a
borrower who, on eight separate occasions, paid back the previous
loan, and then immediately took out a new one for the same
amount.7 °
64. Id. at 9.
65. OCC Corporate Decision No. 2005-11 (July 12, 2005), 2005 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 59, at 5.
66. Community Financial Services Association of America, Payday Advance: Fact vs.
Fiction, http://www.cfsa.net/fact_vs_fiction.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
67. Community Financial Services Association of America, Best Practices for the Payday
Advance Industry, http://www.cfsa.net/industrybest-practices.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2007) [hereinafter Best Practices]. These best practices apply to payday loan companies that
belong to the Community Financial Services Association of America, one of the leading payday
lending associations. The Consumer Fed'n of Am. (CFA) is critical of the industry's guidelines,
arguing that "[t]rade groups can't enforce voluntary guidelines against their own members
..... Press Release, Consumer Federation of America, Payday Lenders Shred Consumer Safety
Net (Oct. 3, 2002), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/releases2.cfm?filename=lO0302
payloans.shrednet.txt. The CPA believes that '"Best Practices' are more public relations than
consumer protection." Id.
68. RENT-A-BANK LENDING, supra note 63, at 9.
69. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 601.
70. Johnson, supra note 8, at 67.
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In reality, despite state laws and the industry's assurances,
various studies indicate that many borrowers refinance their
initial loans many times.7 In Illinois, for example, the average
payday loan borrower remains a borrower for at least six months.7 2
In Indiana, seventy-seven percent of loans are rolled over, with the
average borrower refinancing the loan ten times before it is fully
paid.73 The average payday loan borrower will spend $1105 to repay
a $325 loan, and will have an outstanding payday loan for thirty
weeks of the year.74 These studies reveal that many payday loan
borrowers are finding themselves unable to repay their initial loans
within the two-week period, and some are forced to refinance many
times before they are able to repay the initial loan.
There are four reasons that borrowers are often required to
refinance their payday loans. First, lenders frequently make
poor lending decisions by failing to inquire about the borrower's
expenses, or by approving a loan equivalent to a large proportion of
the borrower's monthly income.75 Second, the short period of time
borrowers are given to repay the loan is often insufficient for the
borrower to assemble the sum necessary for repayment.76 Industry
critics note that "[flew low and moderate income consumers can
afford to repay the average [payday loan] in one lump sum and still
have enough to cover other expenses without having to roll-over the
loan or borrow again before the next payday."77 If the borrower's
paycheck was insufficient to meet expenses during one pay period,
it will probably be insufficient to meet the next pay period's
financial needs, especially because additional funds will be required
to repay the loan.78
71. E.g., Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 608.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Predatory Lending and Its Impact on the Military and Local Communities: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Rural Enterprise, Agriculture, and Technology of the H. Comm.
on Small Business, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (written statement of the
Center for Responsible Lending), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/
Testimony-Graves-payday-032905.pdf.
75. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 59-60.
76. Id.; see also Bruch, supra note 1, at 1281.
77. RENT-A-BANK LENDING, supra note 63, at 8.
78. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 59.
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The third reason for extensive refinancing is the industry's
prohibition on accepting partial payments.7 9 Even if a borrower has
$299 to pay back a $300 loan, he or she cannot repay the loan, but
must refinance the full amount and pay an additional finance
charge. The industry's unwillingness to accept partial payments
leads to the fourth reason refinancing so commonly occurs: if the
only way borrowers can prevent default is by rolling over the loan,
paying a refinancing fee, and paying returned-check fees if the
lender has deposited the postdated check, the borrowers will often
be unable to save the required sum of money by the next date
payment is due. °
For example, a borrower that manages to save only $100 toward
repaying a $200 loan must refinance, and pay the cost of refinancing
the loan, in addition to returned-check fees. These additional fees
may end up costing the borrower the entire $100 initially ear-
marked for loan repayment. After refinancing the loan, the borrower
might again save only $100 toward loan repayment by the next
due date, and would again be forced to spend his entire $100 in
fees. For some borrowers, this cycle ends only after they have spent
up to a thousand dollars in their efforts to repay a loan of just a few
hundred dollars.8'
Payday loan refinancing continues to be a problem because
lenders have little incentive to restrict it. 82 Most laws designed to
restrict refinancing are simply circumvented or ignored by creative
lenders.8 3 A viable solution for the problems associated with payday
lending must do more than create laws to restrict lenders; it must
provide lenders with an incentive for eliminating those practices
injurious to borrowers. Such incentives are essential to payday
lending regulation because lenders have, historically, attempted to
circumvent regulations.
79. Id.
80. E.g., Chessin, supra note 37, at 409-10.
81. See Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit:
Preserving the Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
1217, 1222 & n.23 (2004) (citing Peter T. Kilborn, New Lenders with Huge Fees Thrive on
Workers with Debts, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999, at A28, as an example of such a situation).
82. Dysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 608.
83. See infra Part II.C.
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C. Attempts To Avoid Regulation
Payday lenders have been creative in their attempts at avoiding
the regulations placed on most other types of lending. Some payday
loan companies, for example, have created sham business transac-
tions in order to avoid being labeled as "lenders." One such transac-
tion is the sale-leaseback business,' in which the payday loan
company "purchases" one of the borrower's appliances for a small
sum of money.85 The lender then "leases" the appliance back to the
borrower for a small fee until the borrower can "repurchase" the
appliance for the price the lender paid.' The lender does not take
actual possession of the appliance; it remains with the borrower
throughout the period of the lease.87 Few would disagree that the
companies engaged in transactions of this type have little interest
in owning used consumer appliances or in leasing those appliances
to their previous owners. The true purpose of such transactions is
to disguise a loan as a lease in order to avoid lending regulations.8
In another ploy, a payday loan company will cash a postdated
check for the borrower and then, for a fee, issue the borrower some
catalog certificates with which the borrower can purchase items
from a catalog provided by the lender.89 Essentially, the fees the
lender charges the borrower are disguised as the cost of buying the
certificates.9 ' In Cashback Catalog Sales v. Price,"' the Southern
District of Georgia was asked to determine whether this type of
transaction should be considered a loan under state lending laws.
The catalog company argued that the cashing of the check and the
sale of the catalog certificates were two separate transactions, and
that neither could therefore be considered a loan.2 Additionally, the
company pointed out that no credit evaluations were made, and no
84. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 18; Robert Elder, Jr., Battle Over Small Loans Turns
into Big Production, WALL ST. J. (Texas Editon), Apr. 28, 1999, at T1.
85. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 18; Elder, supra note 84.
86. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 18.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 24 n.121 ("Payday lenders continue to fabricate new schemes to evade the
law.").
89. Id. at 19-20.
90. See id.
91. 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
92. Id. at 1377.
2007] 2413
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
interest or fees were charged for cashing the check.93 The court
found, however, that the transaction was a loan, and was thus
subject to applicable lending laws.94 The court noted that the
company advertised in the yellow pages under "Loans" and that the
catalog issued by the company did not contain an order form, an
address, an "800" number, a website, or any other information
indicating how those with catalog certificates could redeem them for
merchandise."
These disguised transactions have been increasingly recognized
by courts and lawmakers for what they are: consumer loans. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve has explicitly stated
that payday advances are to be considered loans if the advancer
of the funds regularly extends credit and charges a fee for the
service, regardless of how the fee is characterized." As the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System noted in 2000,
"[t]ransactions in which the parties agree to defer payment of a debt
are 'credit' transactions regardless of the label used to describe
them."9 Although many of the attempts at disguising the loan in
order to avoid regulation are no longer practiced, they illustrate the
willingness of some in the payday loan industry to skirt regulations.
For this reason, effective solutions to payday lending problems must
provide incentives so payday lenders will follow the law instead of
seeking creative ways to circumvent it.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1380.
95. Id. at 1377.
96. The Federal Reserve Board's Division of Consumer and Community Affairs
interpreted the definition of credit to comprise such schemes:
Credit includes a transaction in which a cash advance is made to a consumer in
exchange for the consumer's personal check, or in exchange for the consumer's
authorization to debit the consumer's deposit account, and where the parties
agree either that the check will not be cashed or deposited, or that the
consumer's deposit account will not be debited, until a designated future date.
This type of transaction is often referred to as a "payday loan" or "payday
advance" or "deferred presentment loan." A fee charged in connection with such
a transaction may be a finance charge for purposes of § 226.4, regardless of how
the fee is characterized under state law. Where the fee charged constitutes a
finance charge under § 226.4 and the person advancing funds regularly extends
consumer credit, that person is a creditor ....
Regulation 2 Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. § 226, Supp. 1, at 226.2(a)(14) (2006).
97. Truth in Lending, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129, 17,130 (Mar. 31, 2000).
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D. Questionable Collection Practices
Opponents of the payday loan industry have cited the industry's
questionable collection practices as another reason for increased
regulation.9" While the industry's Best Practices guidelines instruct
member loan stores to avoid harassing borrowers,99 some critics
charge that harassment still occurs.1' ° One of the most shocking
collection practices, however, takes advantage of bad check laws
designed to protect innocent merchants, who unknowingly accept
checks, from dishonest buyers, who know that the checks will be
returned due to insufficient funds.' Some payday loan lenders try
to coerce borrowers into repaying a loan by threatening criminal
prosecution for bad-check writing if a borrower does not repay his
loan. 502
Some states also allow merchants to collect punitive damages,
sometimes for up to three times the face value of the check, when a
buyer knowingly issues a bad check.0 3 Payday lenders take
advantage of these laws by cashing the borrower's postdated check
after the borrower fails to pay, knowing it will be returned
unpaid. 04 The lenders then threaten to (or actually do) sue for and
collect punitive damages against the defaulted borrowers;0 5 the
theory in support of punitive damages is that when the loan was
issued, the borrower knew that the account from which the check
would be drawn was insufficient to cover the value of the check
98. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 77.
99. Best Practices, supra note 67.
100. Johnson, supra note 8, at 77-78 (describing borrower complaints about "vexing" phone
calls, threats of violence, excessive damages being collected, threats of criminal prosecution,
and lender requirements that borrowers waive any privacy rights against the lender and
provide descriptions of their automobiles).
101. See id. at 78.
102. In one Dallas precinct alone, payday lenders filed over 13,000 criminal complaints.
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 610.
103. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-1(B); 5/17-1a (West 2003) (providing treble
damages and attorneys' fees as remedies against those who knowingly issue a bad check with
the intent to gain control over the property, labor, or services of another person); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.61 (West 2004) (allowing the victims of some crimes, including the
recipients of bad checks, to recover liquidated damages equaling the greater of $200 or triple
the amount of the check; explicitly exempting checks tendered to check-cashing businesses
from the triple damages provision but not from the $200 provision).
104. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 600-01; Johnson, supra note 8, at 78-80.
105. Johnson, supra note 8, at 79-80.
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written to the lender. One Illinois debtor, for example, borrowed
$200 with a check written for $240, and eventually defaulted on the
loan. °6 The payday lender sued seeking $1260, almost four times
the value of the loan. °'0 This figure included the value of the initial
loan, an additional $720 in punitive damages, and $300 in attor-
ney's fees.' °8
The threat and the use of bad check laws further exacerbates the
refinancing problem, as explained by the Consumer Federation of
America and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group:
A customer who fails to redeem the check for cash or have
enough on deposit to cover the deposited check or electronic
withdrawal on the due date faces bounced check fees from both
the payday lender and the bank. Some lenders in some states
sue for triple damages under civil bad check provisions. And,
some lenders have threatened or used the criminal bad check
laws when customers are unable to repay. Faced with the high
cost of default, many borrowers rollover their debts."°
Fearing criminal and/or civil penalties when they are unable to
repay their payday loans, borrowers have little choice but to
refinance."10
The availability of bad check laws places payday loan borrowers
in a situation that is unique to payday lending. Unlike borrowers
from more traditional sources, payday loan borrowers face the
possibility of both civil and criminal prosecution, including the
possibility of treble or other punitive damages."' This situation
forces borrowers, who would ordinarily default, to refinance, rather
than face additional repercussions. By allowing lenders to prosecute
borrowers for writing a bad check, the law essentially allows
borrowers to be prosecuted for defaulting on their debts."' While the
law should seek to discourage borrowers from defaulting on debts,
106. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 612 n.127.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. RENT-A-BANK LENDING, supra note 63, at 8.
110. Id.
111. Compare Johnson, supra note 8, at 89 ("Normally, a consumer does not commit a crime
when he or she defaults on a loan."), supra note 60 and accompanying text, and infra note 114
and accompanying text, with Johnson, supra note 8, at 78, 86-87.
112. Johnson, supra note 8, at 89-90.
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it should not do so by criminalizing the failure to pay. Debtor's
prison has not existed in the United States since the Civil War,
113
and it should not be reinstituted today for punishing defaulting
payday loan borrowers.
Using bad check laws to collect on unpaid loans puts payday loan
companies in a favorable position not available to other creditors.
"You don't get sued for triple your car payment if you miss a car
payment," noted Jean Ann Fox, director of consumer protection for
the Consumer Federation of America." 4 "But," she added, "payday
lenders have been doing this because no one put a stop to it.""' 5 The
payday loan industry's recovery efforts should be limited to the
remedy available to other lenders: a civil suit for the amount of the
debt and reasonable court fees.
Allowing payday lenders to take advantage of bad check laws is
especially troublesome because, properly understood, "[p] ayday loan
prosecutions concern the breach of a contract to repay a loan, not
the deceptive practice of convincing a creditor that a bad check was
good.""' Unlike innocent merchants who unknowingly receive bad
checks for their wares, payday lenders are fully aware that borrow-
ers do not have sufficient funds in their accounts to cover the check;
otherwise, the borrower would not be seeking a payday loan.
117
Payday lenders insist on receiving a postdated check from a
borrower with full knowledge that the borrower does not currently
have sufficient funds in her account," 8 and lenders should therefore
be estopped from claiming they have been wronged by an action that
they themselves demanded." 9
Even where this practice has been specifically forbidden by
statute, borrowers are often unaware of the protection, so lenders
may still threaten borrowers, even if those threats could not be
113. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 28, at 665.
114. Teresa Dixon Murray, State Law Will Help 'Payday' Debtors, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 2, 2000, at 1C.
115. Id.
116. Johnson, supra note 8, at 130.
117. Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, TN, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051 (M.D.
Tenn. 1999).
118. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 601. In some cases, especially through Internet-
based lenders, a delayed automatic debit agreement is used in place of a check. Id.
119. Id. at 611 ("Certainly a lender's exaction of a fee to 'defer' deposit signifies the
requisite acceptance ... necessary to remove the transaction from the realm of the criminal bad
check statute.").
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executed.120 After Ohio forbade payday lenders from using bad check
laws to collect treble damages, for example, not only were borrowers
unaware of the changes, but many payday lenders continued to
warn borrowers in their contracts that if the borrower defaulted, the
lender would sue for and collect triple the amount owed.12" '
Because laws preventing lenders from seeking civil or criminal
penalties against defaulting borrowers might not prevent some
lenders from nevertheless threatening to do so, effective payday
lending reform should ensure that borrowers recognize and
understand that the lender cannot use civil or criminal bad check
laws. This reform would prevent lenders from using invalid threats
in an attempt to collect the debt.'22 Effective regulation of the
payday loan industry must ensure that fair collection practices are
followed.
III. USURY LAWS
A. Why Usury Laws Fail: Charter Renting
Many payday loan opponents have called for the application of
strict usury laws to payday loan transactions in order to solve the
problems associated with payday lending.'23 Setting aside for a
moment questions about the wisdom of usury laws in payday
lending, it should be noted that such efforts have often failed to
resolve payday lending problems because of what lending commen-
tators call "charter renting."'24 The National Bank Act (NBA) allows
nationally chartered banks to charge interest at the rate allowed by
the state in which the bank is located, even if the usury laws of the
120. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 80-81.
121. Id.
122. For example, Kentucky amended its payday loan statute to require a posted notice
informing borrowers that they could not be criminally prosecuted. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
368.100(18) (LexisNexis 2002) (to be codified at KY. REV. STAT. § 286.9-100(18)).
123. See, e.g., Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 657-66; Graves & Peterson, supra note
28, at 829-31; Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15
PEPP. L. REV. 151, 173-74 (1988).
124. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-expanding Exportation Doctrine and
Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 575 (2004); see also Graves
& Peterson, supra note 28, at 828 (discussing Texas payday lenders' use of the "charter-
renting' legal strategy" to evade state law).
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state in which the loan is issued set a lower maximum rate.125
Similarly, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) also allows state-chartered banks
that are federally insured to charge an interest rate allowed by the
laws of the state in which the bank is located. 12
Some payday lenders have taken advantage of the NBA and
DIDMCA to avoid the usury laws of the state in which they do
business. These lenders contract with national banks or federally
insured banks from another state, and the banks officially extend
credit to the payday borrower. 12 This strategy enables the payday
lender to charge the maximum rate allowed by the law of the state
where the bank is located, rather than that of the state in which the
lender is located. 128 In essence, the bank rents its charter to the
payday loan lender so that the lender can avoid the usury laws of
the state where loans are made. Some payday lending critics have
called this "[t]he most controversial issue in payday lending." 29
One example of the inefficacy of usury laws due to charter renting
occurred a few years ago in Virginia. Virginia attempted to elimi-
nate payday lending by enforcing a maximum Annual Percentage
Rate (APR) of thirty-six percent on all small loans.3a Three national
payday loan companies partnered with national banks, however, to
circumvent this restriction, and thrived in Virginia by charging
around $17 for every $100 borrowed.'3 '
Virginia's trouble regulating payday lending fees is not unique.
According to documents filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Wells Fargo has extended millions of dollars of credit
to the nation's largest payday loan chain, Ace Cash Express, and
125. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000); Marquette Natl Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 313-19 (1978) (holding that a Nebraska national bank was permitted to charge credit
card holders in Minnesota the interest rate allowed under Nebraska law).
126. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000).
127. Schiltz, supra note 124, at 582.
128. Id.
129. See RENT-A-BANK LENDING, supra note 63, at 4.
130. Id.
131. Id. ACE Cash express partnered with Goleta National Bank in California, Money Mart
partnered with Eagle National Bank in Pennsylvania, and Advance America partnered with
BankWest, a state bank in South Dakota. Id.
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has given a $9 million line of credit to Dollar Financial Corporation,
the nation's second-largest chain.132
According to payday loan critics, "[t]he primary motivation of
the payday lenders in entering into these arrangements was to
obtain the benefit of [the NBA's] exportation powers." '133 The payday
lenders did not partner with banks in order to benefit from the
banks expertise in making loans; many of the payday lenders
already had extensive experience in making loans.' And payday
lenders could easily cash the checks made out to them without
needing to partner with banks for their power to accept deposits.'35
In fact, in most charter-renting partnerships, the banks have had
little, if any, control over lending.1" 6
Charter renting runs contrary to the purpose of the NBA, which
was originally "to establish a system of national banking institu-
tions, in order to provide a uniform and secure currency for the
people, and to facilitate the operations of the Treasury of the United
States."'37 Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke commented
that "[charter renting] gives us an enormous amount of concern
because we believe it is an improper use of the national bank
charter.""13 The California Department of Financial Institutions
warned banks that partnering with payday loan companies meant
risking damage to their reputations.'39
This is not to say it is impossible to regulate the industry unless
the loophole allowing charter renting is closed. Georgia recently
passed legislation that might provide a successful blueprint for
preventing charter renting.4 ' The Georgia legislature recognized
that, despite an opinion issued by the state attorney general in
132. Ron Nixon et al., Borrowing Trouble: Banks Have Financed Payday Lenders'
Expansion, STAR TRIBUTE (Minneapolis), Aug. 15, 2004, at 15A. A list of some other prominent
partnerships can be found in Schiltz, supra note 124, at 582 n.306.
133. Schlitz, supra note 124, at 582.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 582-83.
137. Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U.S. 138, 154 (1887).
138. Paul Beckett, Risky Business: Exploiting a Loophole, Banks Skirt State Laws on High
Interest Rates, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at Al.
139. See Mary Fricker, Any Day Can Be Payday as Check-cashing Stores Proliferate:
Sonoma County Banks Take Steps To Offer More Service to Less-traditional Customers, PRESS
DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Ca..), Aug. 26, 2001, at El.
140. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1 (Supp. 2006).
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2002141 stating that payday lending was illegal, and despite a cease-
and-desist order issued by the Industrial Loan Commission, payday
loan companies had continued operating by attempting "to cause
these transactions to appear to be 'loans' made by a national or state
bank chartered in another state in which this type of lending is
unregulated, even though the majority of the revenues in this
lending method are paid to the payday lender."'
142
In response, Georgia passed legislation forbidding in-state payday
loan companies from issuing loans for and acting as an agent for
out-of-state banks when the payday loan companies retain more
than half of the proceeds from the loan.' The regulation did not
prevent national banks or out-of-state banks, however, from issuing
their own payday loans within the state.'
A few payday loan companies and their out-of-state bank partners
filed a lawsuit against the Georgia Attorney General and Secretary
of State, attacking the validity of the law. 4 ' The suit alleged that
the law was preempted by section 27(a) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, that it violated the dormant Commerce Clause, and
that it violated the Federal Arbitration Act.'46 The court, however,
held that the Georgia statute did not conflict with any federal law
because of the exceptions afforded to out-of-state and national
banks. 1
7
By seeking to eliminate the payday loan industry, Georgia's
legislation might eliminate one of the few legitimate credit options
some borrowers may have. 4 ' But this legislation indicates that if a
state wishes to stop payday loan companies from renting the
charters of national and out-of-state banks, there might be a way to
do so that would not require Congress to amend the NBA and
DIDMCA.
Some legal commentators have speculated that closing the NBA
and DIDMCA loopholes is necessary to prevent payday lenders from
avoiding statutory limitations on not only high interest rates but
141. 2002 Op. Ga. Att'y Gen. 3 (2002), 2002 Ga. AG LEXIS 10.
142. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1(c) (Supp. 2006).
143. Id.
144. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2(a)(3) (Supp. 2006).
145. Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
146. Id. at 1300.
147. Id. at 1302.
148. See infra Section III.B.
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also refinancing. 149 No court has directly addressed this proposition.
Although one payday loan company tried to avail itself of the
argument that the NBA loophole indeed applied to refinancing
limitations and exempted the company from those state laws, 5 ' the
court did not address the argument. '51 Despite the lack of a
definitive decision on the issue, the NBA and DIDMCA are unlikely
to be found to apply to refinancing for two reasons. First, courts are
increasingly recognizing that payday loan companies are not
national or out-of-state banks, and should thus not be afforded any
of the benefits of such entities.15' The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency agreed, stating that payday loan companies cannot
use federal laws designed for national banks to avoid compliance
with state regulations.' Second, the language of the NBA and
DIDMCA refers only to interest rates; it does not apply to limita-
tions on refinancing."5 4 For these reasons, a court would be hard-
pressed to justify applying the loopholes to refinancing laws.
While closing these loopholes is not, on its face, a poor suggestion,
payday loan critics who call for the removal of the loopholes focus
the debate on interest rates and usury laws, rather than on the
refinancing problem, and any successful regulation must address
payday loan refinancing. Also, as the following Section will show,
imposing usury laws on payday lending could actually harm some
potential borrowers.
149. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 125-27.
150. Colo. et. rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1284 (D. Colo.
2002).
151. The court did not specifically rule on whether the NBA and DIDMCA would apply to
refinancing as well as interest rates, making clear that the question was irrelevant because
the payday loan company was not a national bank. Id. at 1285. According to the court, the
case was "strictly ... about a non-bank's violation of state law." Id.
152. See, e.g., id.; Terry v. Payday Loan Corp., No. 99 C 2487,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16793,
at *3 (N.D. IlI. 1999); Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. City of St. Louis Bd. of Adjustment, 62 S.W.3d
408, 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
153. See Nicole Duran, In Brief OCC Weighs in on Payday Lender Case, AM. BANKER, Oct.
3, 2001, at 4.
154. The NBA exception allows national banks to charge "interest at the rate allowed by
the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located." 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000)
(emphasis added). Similarly, the DIDMCA exception allows out-of-state banks to charge
"interest at a rate of not more than ... the rate allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or
district where the bank is located." 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
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B. The Disadvantages of Imposing Stricter Usury Laws
If states enact and enforce usury laws that are as strict as those
called for by opponents of the payday loan industry, the amount of
payday loan debt would probably be reduced significantly. This
effect would not, however, result from lenders beginning to make
reasonable loans; instead, it would occur because payday lenders
would most likely stop making loans altogether.'55
There are two reasons that usury laws are not the best solution
to payday lending problems. First, payday loans are fundamentally
different from other types of loans, and should be recognized and
treated as such. Payday lending opponents characterize the fee
associated with a payday loan in terms of an APR, and then present
the resulting figure, which is normally very high, as proof that
payday lenders are taking advantage of borrowers. 5 But the small,
short-term nature of the payday loan makes the APR seem more
oppressive than it actually is. An APR of 391%, which would be a
shocking interest rate for a five-year, $20,000 auto loan, actually
amounts to only a one-time payment of $15 for a $100 payday
loan. "
If characterized as an APR, almost any fee can be made to appear
preposterously high. For example, a $29 late fee on a $100 credit
card charge, if expressed as an APR, would be 756%; a $47 late/
reconnection fee on a $100 utility bill would be considered to have
a 1225% APR; and even an ATM charge of $1.44 for a one day
withdrawal of $100 could be thought of as 526% APR. 58 Calculating
fees as an APR does not make sense for payday loans, and some
states have wisely focused on limiting the cost of the fees as a
percentage of the total loan, rather than attempting to limit the
APR. This approach makes more sense; most borrowers can more
easily calculate and understand the cost of loan if it is characterized
as "10% of the amount borrowed" rather than "350% APR."' 59
155. See FIN. SERV. CTRS. OFAM., FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR CONSUMERS: THE TRUTH ABOUT
DEFERRED DEPOSIT SERVICES, pt. IV (1999), http://www.fisca.orgtddresponse.htm.
156. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 1, at 1279.
157. PAYDAY ADVANCE, supra note 54, at 13.
158. Id.
159. This Note does not advocate that the APR should be withheld from the borrower. It
only points out that opponents of the payday loan industry often use the APR in their
attempts to show that payday lending interest and fees are outrageous, when in fact the fees
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The second argument against capping interest rates at a low level
is that caps would likely eliminate the payday loan industry
completely. Although payday lenders face the same costs associated
with offering and underwriting loans that lenders of larger amounts
face, payday loan companies have higher-risk borrowers. 16 0 Because
of the short time period and high risk of payday loans, the interest
rate must be higher than that of other loans so that the industry
entrepreneurs can make a profit.16" ' The truth of this statement is
evident from the experience of banks that have attempted to
issue small, short-term loans at an APR lower than that of
payday lenders; these banks have found such loans unprofitable. 62
According to the industry, in states where laws have been overly
restrictive, payday lending has in fact disappeared.6 3
The payday loan industry and its supporters argue that the
complete elimination of payday lending is the real goal of consumer
protection groups."" At least one industry supporter has even gone
so far as to allege that those seeking elimination of the industry "are
dictating which types of financial services we should use" and thus
threaten the "[c] onsumer freedom [that] is the very core of American
alone (ignoring the issue of refinancing) are not a serious problem for most borrowers. See,
e.g., Bruch, supra note 1, at 1279. In truth, most borrowers probably care little about the APR
and are instead concerned with the amount of the fee. See Diane Hellwig, Note, Exposing the
Loansharks in Sheep's Clothing: Why Re-regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes
Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1567, 1592-93 (2005) (explaining that despite the
frequent use of the term APR, "most consumers do not understand the significance of this
credit term or even take note of it"). A borrower is better informed by knowing the cost of the
fee than by receiving an annual percentage that the majority of borrowers may not
understand. But see Graves & Peterson, supra note 28, at 661-62 (arguing that APR
terminology is appropriate because it is "the uniform metric which all mainstream creditors
use" for both long- and short-term loans and borrowers, who, data reveals, do not understand
APR, would be surprised to know that a 17.5% principal fee is in fact twenty-six times higher
than a 17.5% APR; arguing for APR terminology also because the frequency of refinancing
belies claims that payday loans are truly short term and therefore do not necessitate APR
terminology); Hellwig, supra, at 1593 (arguing in favor of using APR because it provides a
standard by which borrowers can evaluate their credit options).
160. Tom Lehman, In Defense of Payday Lending, FREE MARKET, Sept. 2003, available at
http://www.mises.org/freemarket-detail.asp?control=454&sortorder--articledate.
161. Id.
162. See Mary Wisniewski, How To Break the Payday Loan Cycle: Look To Educate
Borrowers, Build Long-term Customers, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at 72.
163. FIN. SERV. CTRS. OF AM., supra note 155, pt. IV (citing Tennessee as a jurisdiction
whose laws have eviscerated the deferred-deposit industry).
164. Id.
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democracy."'65 This argument is probably an exaggeration; the
elimination of the payday loan industry is unlikely to threaten the
very core of democracy. Nevertheless, the best way to both regulate
a problematic industry and to preserve consumer freedom is rarely,
if ever, to simply eliminate the industry, especially if that industry
provides a service that is unavailable from other sources. 6' Instead,
the ideal resolution is to find a balance in the market that allows
payday lending to be conducted responsibly.
Eliminating the payday loan industry is a poor solution not
because it threatens democracy, but because doing away with the
industry could eliminate the only source of credit available to some
financially strapped consumers.'67 The Financial Service Centers of
America (FiSCA), one of the trade associations of the payday loan
industry, explains why most payday loan customers seek a payday
loan instead of other options:
What [industry opponents have] not told the country is that
short-term advances for sums of less than $500.00 are virtually
unobtainable throughout the United States through small loan
companies for the deferred deposit service customer. These
consumers usually do not have cash reserve accounts at banks,
credit card advances available or sufficient unencumbered real
estate to support home equity loans. Within the realm of lawful
financial products, only deferred deposit services can satisfy the
consumer's need. 168
Payday lending has seen such a dramatic increase in the past
decade because of an absence of other small loan providers in the
traditional market. 169 Deregulation has increased competition,
prompting most traditional institutions to abandon small, short-
165. Daniel J. Popeo, Chairman, Wash. Legal Found., In All Fairness: Stealing Consumer
Choice (Feb. 24, 2003), http://www.wlf.orglupload/2-24-03ConsumerChoiceslick.pdf.
166. See Stegman & Faris, supra note 7, at 29.
167. Some experimental credit unions have begun to offer payday-type loans, for lower fees
and in combination with financial education. See, e.g., Wisniewski, supra note 162. Such
programs are rare, however, and conventional payday lenders claim to control ninety-nine
percent of the market. Id.
168. FIN. SERV. CTRS. OFAM., supra note 155, pt. IV.
169. Lisa Blaylock Moss, Note, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment
Transactions & the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1725, 1732 (2000).
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term loans as unprofitable. 70 Most retailers have replaced install-
ment plans with credit card sales, limiting the options available to
those who do not qualify for credit cards."7 ' Finance companies have
also abandoned small loans in order to switch their focus to home
equity financing.'72 Because of these changes, many payday loan
borrowers' only credit option is a payday loan. 7 ' Payday loan
borrowers do have bank accounts, but some are still unable to
obtain other sources of traditional credit."'74 As legal commentator
Michael Barr has noted, "[w]hile payday loan consumers are not
unbanked, they could well be referred to as 'underbanked': They
may lack the savings, credit history, or financial know-how to
avoid purchasing a high-cost credit instrument."'7 5 To eliminate
the payday loan industry would mean that when "under-banked"
individuals face a legitimate emergency, they have no legal access
to money.
176
Some legal commentators believe that this reduction in available
credit is good for consumers. They argue that "[w]hile reducing the
supply of credit may deprive some incapacitated persons of credit,
part of the borrowing by the incapacitated is prompted only by
temptation, ignorance, or aberration."'77 This line of reasoning
implies that most payday loan borrowers want money for unneces-
sary expenses, or out of foolishness or ignorance. Supporters of
strict usury laws thus argue, whether intentionally or unintention-
170. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 152 (2004); Moss, supra
note 169, at 1732. One credit union in Chicago, for example, offers a six-month loan of up to
$500 at 16.5% APR, quite low compared to payday loans. Wisniewski, supra note 162. The
manager admitted that the credit union loses money on the loans. Id.
171. Barr, supra note 170, at 152.
172. Id.
173. Id. According to a study funded by the payday loan industry, seventy-three percent
of payday borrowers had previously been turned down for traditional credit or not given as
much credit as desired, and sixty-eight percent considered applying for other credit but
thought they would be turned down. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 17, at 46.
174. Barr, supra note 170, at 153.
175. Id.
176. See Moss, supra note 169, at 1732 ("[A] large number of consumers lack sufficient
credit card limits or bank overdraft protection to meet their needs for small unsecured
loans.").
177. Morris, supra 123, at 174.
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ally, that a limitation on credit is necessary to protect consumers
from their own foolishness.
17
The payday loan industry responds that the majority of its
borrowers use payday loans for unforeseen circumstances, and not
for frivolous purchases. 179 Economists Michael Stegman and Robert
Faris, staunch opponents of the industry, conducted a study finding
many problems with the payday loan industry. Despite their
distaste for the industry, they concluded that the elimination of the
payday lending was not in the best interest of consumers:
Although some might argue that the way to deal with abuses
discussed in this article is ... to ... ban payday lending outright,
we do not agree that this is the best approach. The reality is that
decent, hard-working families who end up with too much month
left at the end of their money will go underground if necessary
to get help.8 °
If payday loans are eliminated, borrowers who have a genuine
emergency, but no access to other credit, might be forced to obtain
illegal, unregulated, less desirable loans."8'
One obvious solution to payday lending concerns would be to
implement programs that eliminate the need for small, short-term
loans. This solution is perfect in theory, but is unperfected in
reality. One proposal is the use of individual development accounts,
or IDAs. IDAs are matched savings accounts for the poor, funded
using both private and public money.8 2 The accounts can be used to
help buy a house, to receive higher education and training, or to
open a small business.8 3 According to proponents, $600 million from
178. Id. (calling usury standards "a paternalistic goal, perhaps, but a legitimate use of
paternalism").
179. According to the Credit Research Center, about two-thirds of payday loan borrowers
needed the loan for an emergency or to get through a temporary income reduction.
ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 17, at 47.
180. Stegman & Faris, supra note 7, at 29.
181. See id.
182. Ray Boshara, Individual Development Accounts: Policies To Build Savings and Assets
for the Poor, 32 BROOKINGS INSTITUTION POLICY BRIEF: WELFARE REFORM & BEYOND 1 (2005),
available at http://www.brookings.edules/researchlprojects/wrb/publications/pb/pb32.pdf.
183. Id.
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public funds and private donations could, within the next decade,
extend IDAs to half a million people.1
8 4
Even if IDAs could be issued to all impoverished Americans, they
would still fail to eliminate the need for short-term loans. IDAs are
a useful tool to help establish financial independence, but they
cannot be used for emergencies such as health care or car repairs.8 '
For these expenses, borrowers would still have to look to payday or
similar lenders for relief.
There will always be some who need extra cash and are willing to
do almost anything necessary to obtain it. It is better to have a
regulated payday loan industry that provides the needed funds
than to impose strict usury laws that eliminate profitable payday
lending and force desperate consumers to turn instead to illegiti-
mate sources.
IV. A BETTER, MORE BALANCED SOLUTION
Many payday lending reformers have called for tighter caps on
the interest rate of payday loans.8 6 Yet, few borrowers are over-
whelmed because of the initial service charge;"8 7 most financial
problems arise when borrowers are forced to refinance and to pay
the refinancing fee several times before the loan is paid in full.88
Even the Center for Responsible Lending, an organization that calls
payday lending interest rates "outrageous," recognizes that multiple
refinancing is "the bigger problem." ' 9 Only when the loan is
refinanced several times do the "triple-digit APRs charged by most
payday lenders ... go beyond what is fair and become abusive and
predatory."'9
There are four changes that must be made to the payday loan
industry to ensure that borrowers are treated fairly: better assur-
184. Id. at 7.
185. See id. at 1.
186. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.B.
187. The average fee of one large payday loan provider is only $53.81 for an average loan
(including principal and fee) of $360.39. QC Holdings, Inc. Reports Third Quarter Results: 53
Stores Added During the Quarter, BUSINESS WIRE, Nov. 2, 2005.
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. Hearing, supra note 74 (written statement of the Center for Responsible Lending),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Testimony-Graves payday-032905.pdf.
190. See Stegman & Faris, supra note 7, at 20.
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ances that borrowers have enough information to make an informed
decision, a reduction in the number of times a borrower can
refinance, reform of collection techniques, and increased enforce-
ment of regulations.
A. Provide Information
The first step to regulating payday lending is to ensure that
borrowers have enough information and shopping freedom to be able
to make educated decisions. For payday loan borrowers, some types
of information are more valuable than others. The most valuable
information is that which helps a borrower make rational choices
between options:
Information may be useful [for] borrowers if it informs them of
the presence and location of alternative sources of lower cost
credit. This kind of information may help these borrowers
participate in the bargaining process more fully and effectively
if the market has alternatives for them. If the market does not
have alternative sources, however, information is relatively
unimportant to them. Again, information strategy favors the
educated borrower and disfavors the less mobile or educated
borrower, like the elderly and the poor."'
Payday lenders sometimes mislead, lie to, or conceal information
from borrowers, effectively preventing them from shopping around
for better terms and from gaining enough knowledge to make an
informed decision.'92 There are three ways lenders make loan
shopping difficult for borrowers. First, lenders are often not required
to disclose the terms of the contract until immediately before the
borrower signs the contract."' Second, lenders can refuse to discuss
loan terms until the borrower's employer is called, making borrow-
ers less likely to shop around because of fear that their employer
will be called multiple times.'94 Finally, some lenders do not allow
191. Morris, supra note 123, at 174-75.
192. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 32.
193. Id.
194. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-cost Consumer Credit: The
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 896 (2003) ("After the first
employment verification telephone call, many prospective debtors immediately end their
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the borrowers to take the contract from the store or to have a copy
of their signed contract even after the loan is made.19 5
Payday lending laws must ensure that lenders cannot engage in
these practices. Lenders should be required to allow the borrower
adequate time and privacy to study the contract terms before
agreeing to the loan. Lenders should not be allowed to withhold vital
information or to forbid the contract from leaving the store. One
piece of information especially important to borrowers is the total
cost of the loan's fees.'96 Borrowers care most about the cost of the
fee initially charged; they are often unconcerned with, and rarely
understand, the APR.'97 In fact, three-fourths of payday loan users
acknowledge that they do not know the APR charged in their most
recent payday loan transaction. 9 ' Requiring disclosure of total cost
of the loan will mean that borrowers can more easily compare the
costs of competing offers. If borrowers have the ability to compare
the loans of competing companies, the increased competition could
lower costs for borrowers.
The value of information may be limited in some circumstances.
In those cases in which all payday loan options are similar and the
borrower has no option other than a payday loan, information has
little value, because it will not matter which payday loan the
borrower chooses. Regardless of the limitation on the value of
information in some circumstances, information should still be
provided so that borrowers who do have some options can weigh the
costs and benefits of their potential choices.
B. Reduce Refinancing
The high "interest" charged by payday loan companies, considered
alone, does little harm to the consumer.'99 Few consumers have
difficulty paying a one-time fee of about $15 for every $100 bor-
rowed. Financial problems do surface, however, when the borrower
search because they ... predict that embarrassment and the risk of jeopardizing their jobs from
additional phone calls will outweigh any potential savings from searching for a cheaper
loan.").
195. Johnson, supra note 8, at 35-36.
196. See Lehman, supra note 160.
197. Id.
198. See supra note 159.
199. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
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is forced to pay the fee multiple times before the loan is paid off,
especially when relatively large amounts of money are involved. 00
The payday loan regulation needed most is not a limitation on the
APR, but on refinancing. There are four changes that must be made
for the refinancing trap to be eliminated.
First, the amount of time a borrower has to repay a loan must be
extended to thirty days in order to give the borrower adequate time
to repay the loan.2 ' Second, lenders should be required to accept
partial payments.20 2 The loan should not be declared in default, and
no refinancing charge should be made, if the borrower repays at
least half of the loan by the time payment is due. The borrower
should then be given an additional two weeks to repay the remain-
der of the loan. These two steps essentially give the borrower six
weeks (instead of two) to pay off the entire loan, while ensuring
that the lender receives at least half the amount owed during this
period. The borrower should be allowed to refinance only once for a
thirty-day extension at a cost equal to that of the fee initially
charged.
The third change necessary to reduce extensive refinancing is to
limit the value of outstanding payday loans a borrower can have at
one time.203 The number of loans at one time should be capped at
two, the value of which should not exceed $500.204 Some payday
loan opponents express concern about state laws that allow payday
200. See supra Part II.B.
201. See Stegman & Faris, supra note 7, at 29.
202. Indiana has allowed for partial payments before the date the loan is due. IND. CODE
ANN. § 24-4.5-7-402(3) (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess.). But this provision does
little for the borrower because the borrower still must have the loan paid in full within two
weeks. If the due date arrives and the borrower does not have the full amount, he or she still
must refinance. The Virginia Senate recently approved a bill that would allow borrowers with
three or more consecutive payday loans to repay through the use of an extended payment
plan; the plan would allow borrowers to repay the loan over sixty days. S.B. 1014, 2007 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007). After debate in the House about a seventy-two percent
interest-rate ceiling, which critics feared would eliminate the payday loan industry in
Virginia, Pamela Stallsmith & Jeff E. Schapiro, Payday-lending Bill Pulled: House Proposal
Would Have Capped Interest Rate at 72%; Senate Bill May Be Pulled Also, RIcHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 2007, at A6, the legislation was passed, in a form very similar to the Senate
bill, without any interest rate cap. Amy Gardner, House Passes Payday Lending Reform Bill
Without a Rate Cap, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2007, at B3.
203. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-404 (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess.);
S.B. 1014, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007).
204. Five hundred dollars is roughly twenty-five percent of the average monthly salary of
a payday loan borrower. See supra notes 36-40.
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lenders to avoid refinancing restrictions with the "touch and go"
strategy, issuing a second loan to a borrower to pay off a first one,
as long as the amount of the loan does not exceed that allowed by
statute." 5 This practice is a problem because a borrower may use
the second loan to pay off the first, take a third loan to pay off the
second, and so on ad infinitum. To eliminate this "touch-and-go"
lending, after a second loan within the $500 limit, a payday lender
should not be allowed to make a new loan until seven days after
both the loans have been paid in full.20 6
Finally, payday loans should not exceed a certain percentage of
the borrower's income. Indiana prohibits a payday lender from
making a loan if the "total payable amount of the ... loan exceeds
fifteen percent (15%) of the borrower's monthly gross income" as
shown by the paycheck stub the lender already requires.2 7 By
limiting the loan according to the borrower's income, lenders will be
less likely to issue a loan that exceeds the borrower's ability to
repay.
If refinancing has resulted in such a large portion of payday
lenders' business,2 8 these regulations may cut into the industry's
profits. They would not, however, eliminate profit completely, as
would usury laws.20 9 The reduction in profits could be offset by two
potential benefits. First, a large portion of payday loans currently
end in default.210 By discouraging practices that encourage default,
such as excessive refinancing, the regulations this Note proposes
would ensure that a borrower could more easily repay loans and
would be less likely to default.21 Second, these changes will give
payday lending a greater appearance of validity, and more people
will be willing to turn to a payday loan as a legitimate credit option.
205. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 65-66.
206. Proposed legislation in Virginia would prevent a payday lender from issuing a loan
to a borrower on the same day that the borrower repays a previous loan. S.B. 1014, 2007 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007).
207. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-402 (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess.).
208. See supra Part II.B.
209. See supra Part III.B.
210. See Bruch, supra note 1, at 1272.
211. See Tia Martarella, Crimes and Offenses, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 59, 60 (2004)
(discussing the difficulty of getting out of a cycle of refinancing debt).
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C. Forbid Dubious Collection Methods
A few states have recently enacted legislation that specifically
forbids the use of bad check laws in payday loan collection.212 This
is a much needed start, but simply forbidding the use of bad check
laws is insufficient. If the borrower is unaware of the law, the
payday loan company can use the threat of bad check laws in order
to encourage the borrower to pay back the loan, regardless of the
fact that such threats cannot be enforced.213 To ensure that lenders
cannot threaten the use of bad check laws, a means must be created
by which borrowers will be aware of their rights.
One way to ensure that borrowers are aware that payday lenders
cannot use bad check laws in the case of default is to require
borrowers to read and sign a disclosure statement specifying that
bad check laws do not apply to their loans.214 The disclosure
statement should make the borrower aware that the payday loan
company can use neither criminal nor civil bad check laws to
pursue repayment. To ensure that this disclosure statement is
given, a payday lender should not be allowed to sue a borrower in
the case of default unless the lender attaches the signed disclosure
statement to the complaint. This creates an advantage over laws
requiring a posted notice. Currently, officers and state employees
cannot ensure that laws demanding a posted notice are followed
without visiting the payday loan stores to see that the notice is
posted as required. By requiring, instead, that lenders have a signed
disclosure statement before bringing suit against a borrower, the
regulation would be self-enforcing; compliance with the statute
would be in lenders' best interest, so the lenders themselves would
make certain that the requirement was met. Self-interest would
regulate without burdening state resources.
212. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1260 (West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess.);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1301A (2005).
213. See supra notes 119-20.
214. Some borrowers may sign the notice without reading or fully understanding its
content. By requiring the disclosure to be written in simple, conspicuous language, this
possibility could be limited.
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D. Provide Adequate Enforcement
Although many states have enacted payday loan regulations,
enforcement has been difficult.21 After an empirical study of payday
loan companies in twenty states, Steven Graves and Christopher
Peterson were forced to declare that "[1]iterally thousands of
payday lenders around the country openly and systematically
ignore state consumer protection laws.... [No industry with which
we are familiar, with the possible exception of the illegal narcotics
business, so openly ignores the law." '216 For example, borrowers may
obtain loans from several different stores or use a loan from one
store to pay off a loan from another store.2"7 The best way to ensure
that payday loan regulations are followed is to provide incentives for
payday lenders to know and follow the law.
As previously discussed, borrowers should be indebted to only one
payday lender at a time for no more than $500. One proposal for
ensuring that lenders know whether a borrower has outstanding
loans from another payday loan company is to create a state-wide
database that the lender must check before issuing a loan. Florida
has recently created such a database.2"' Payday lenders in Florida
are required to submit personal information, such as the borrower's
name, address, driver's license number, the amount of the transac-
tion, and the date of the transaction, into the Internet-accessible
database, which is available only to Florida payday lenders.2 9
Instituting a system similar to that of Florida would not be
prohibitively costly.220 Many lenders already use tracking technology
in their risk management system, and this could be incorporated
into a state-wide database that lenders could check to see whether
the borrower has taken out a loan from another company within the
215. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 28, at 827.
216. Id.
217. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 601.
218. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(23) (West Supp. 2006). Proposed Virginia legislation would
create a similar, Internet-based system in Virginia. S.B. 1014, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2007).
219. Id.; see also Graves & Peterson, supra note 28, at 740-41.
220. Florida covers the cost by imposing a one dollar fee per transaction. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 560.404(23) (West Supp. 2006). Pending Virginia legislation proposes paying for a similar
system by allowing lenders to charge borrowers a fee of fifty cents. S.B. 1014, 2007 (Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007).
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previous seven days.2 21 If proper incentives are provided for the
lender to use the system and stay within the regulation, the state
would be required to provide little enforcement.
Much like with the proposed bad check law regulation, the lender
should be barred from filing a suit to collect a payday loan debt
unless the lender shows proof that the loan was filed in the system,
did not exceed either the $500 cap or fifteen percent of the bor-
rower's gross income, and was issued at least seven days after all
other payday loans were repaid (or, in the alternative, that the
customer signed a statement attesting that the loan does not exceed
the limitations). Self interest would then ensure that lenders would
stay within the regulation.
Such a system would not be perfect. Some borrowers may receive
loans from an unregistered lender or use the Internet to obtain
loans from other states that would not show up in the state
system.222 Further, some consumers may have privacy concerns,
although such a system seems little different from traditional credit
reporting systems, especially because only payday lenders would
have access. Despite these concerns, Florida has shown that the
database works. Since its implementation, instances of consumers
having multiple outstanding payday loans have decreased by eighty-
two percent.223
CONCLUSION
The payday loan industry must be regulated. Too many borrowers
are forced to refinance loans until they have paid thousands of
dollars for a loan of a few hundred dollars. Too many borrowers are
threatened with lawsuits or criminal charges when they are unable
to repay their loans. Too many payday lenders have sought to avoid
regulation by creatively circumventing, or simply ignoring, the law.
Contrary to the arguments of many legal commentators, however,
imposing strict usury laws on lenders is not the most effective
means of resolving these problems. First, efforts in the past have
been skirted by payday lenders who have paired up with national
banks. Second, enforcing low interest rates could cause the industry
221. Stegman & Faris, supra note 7, at 29.
222. Graves & Peterson, supra note 28, at 741.
223. Id. at 740-41.
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to disappear completely and eliminate the only means of credit
available to some borrowers.
The best regulations would not risk the elimination of the payday
loan industry. The best answer for payday lending problems is to
focus on providing information to borrowers, reducing refinancing,
protecting borrowers from unfair collection practices, and enforcing
regulations. If these changes are made, borrowers will remain able
to take advantage of a useful service, and yet be protected from
abuse. If these changes are made, Allan Jones's revitalization of the
payday loan industry can be preserved in a manner that satisfies
both borrowers and lenders.
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